woensdag 12 november 2014

Harvest game

For the one reviewing me on the harvest game: I have missed the harvest game, so I will not upload any matter related to that lecture

Sabatier and external control


The government has the power to initiate policies that promote or stimulate the use of LCA's. I will name four that have been named by Frank Boons in his lecture on 6 nov 2014;

Altering market conditions.
The government can stimulate the use of LCA's by altering market conditions in such a way that it creates incentives when using LCA's. For example, the government could subsidize companies that are willing to use LCA's but can't because the process is long and the software is expensive. This may be an incentive for companies to use an LCA, since an analysis like this is time consuming and thus expensive.

Altering available information.
LCA's can be promoted as well through altering information. If certain activities require an assessment of environmental performance, then offering information on LCA's on for example online searching tools can have a positive impact on the use of LCA's. This puts LCA in the spotlights while other environmental assessment tools may also be of use but less known because they are not displayed.

Self governance systrems may be used by the government as well to promote the use LCA. Certain organisations or groups of organisations have core beliefs and secondary beliefs (Sabatier, 1998). These secondary aspects are based on various causal factors that may be altered by external control from the government. The government can subsidise an organisation that offers LCA's, allowing them to sell their services cheaper, or promote their services more active through media. This way, the government uses private self governance systems to promote the use of LCA's.

Another way for the government to increase the use of LCA's is to invest in research done to improve LCA methods. This in turn makes LCA a more trustworthy method and therfore it could gain popularity.

Effectiveness of measures
To assess whether the sorts of emasures presented above are effective in comparison to other measures, one can find it usefull to use Sabatiers framework (1980) that describes different stages of the implementation process of a policy. five main steps are described:

1. Policy outputs of implementing agency
2. compliance with policy output by target groups
3. actual impacts of policy outputs
4. perceived impacts of policy outputs
5. major revision in statute

In my opinion, step 3 and 4 are most important in assessing the results of an implemented policy. At first sight, it may seem most important to review the actual impacts of a policy. However, it usually takes a couple of years for results of policies to actually become clear, therefore assumptions may change over time and may differ strongly amongst different organisations/coalitions. Therefore it is in my opinion at least as important to review the perceived impacts of policy outputs, since these may be viewed as truth as well. 

maandag 3 november 2014

Sodexo and TU Delft in a tight network

Lunch at the TU Delft

Since 2009 I study at the TU Delft. A regular day means being on campus from 8:45 to around 17:30. To be able to survive a 9 hour working day, it is probably most important to have good lunch and foods in between. Usually, I pack my own lunch: 6-8 sandwiches and a banana/apple. However, being a student and therefore having a very diverse schedule (each weak is different), it is not always possible to have done the groceries I need every day to pack the lunch I described. This results in the one and only lunch possibility: Sodexo. This company equips the TU Delft campus with everything needed to serve food: machinery, storage facilities, kitchens, cooks and other employees. This makes Sodexo a production facility. Their scale of operation is mainly in the Randstad, which makes them a regional production facility.


Sodexo network

Sodexo has multiple clients in the network and per client the network is quite the same. The network is pictured below. 




For the description of this network, I will use the TU Delft as an example, since I am personally experienced with this organisation. Sodexo is hired by the TU Delft and they maintain a continuous organisational interaction. Sodexo takes care of the supplier, who in principle has little contact with the client. Most of the contact will go via Sodexo. The consumers have both contact with Sodexo and the TU Delft, since they are buying their food from Sodexo, which is situated in the TU Delft faculties. Sodexo has certain contact with the government, since the government sets the norms concerning food production.


Resource Dependency 

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) present resource dependancy as a mechanism that explains strategic behaviour of firms. It is preferable for an organisation to be little dependent from other firms in the network as possible. In this network, we see that the TU dependancy is larger since it has outsourced its catering and supply of catering to Sodexo. However, Sodexo is still dependent on the contracts it has with the TU Delft. If the TU Delft does not continue cooperation with Sodexo, they loose a big client.

A strategy applied by Sodexo and the TU Delft is by gaining control. A long term contract has given Sodexo the right to fullfill nearly all catering functions on the TU Delft campus, not serving lunch but everything food related. This gives TU Delft a long term control over their expenses concerning food, while it gives Sodexo a long term monopoly on the TU Delft campus.


Resource networks

The existing network created by the TU Delft and Sodexo has rules that are defensive when speaking of the limits of the playing field. By limits I mean the geopraphical limits of the TU Delt campus, in which the playing field consists of the cafeteria's and public space of the campus. By creating the contract described above, Sodexo has won the right to serve food on the TU Delft campus. Other catering services can only sell food on permission of the TU Delft. This defensive form of networking creates barriers to entry of the network.


Sodexo & TU Delft: easy loop closing?

Concerning the defensive network that the TU Delft created with Sodexo, it will be rather difficult to work towards a closed material loop if the innovation has to come from outside the network. As described before, the network is hard to break through due to the contract made between Sodexo and TU Delft. So any influences on the catering system of the TU Delft from outside have no effect since Sodexo is (almost) the only catering service allowed to serve on the Campus. However, when the innovation comes from inside the network, it may be easier for the TU Delft and Sodexo to work towards a closed loop material cycle. This is because there is a clear power relation: TU Delft can steer their client towards a new way of working. At the same time the TU Delft has a lot of resources to make an innovation happen: many students can cooperate and there may be a large capital reserved by the TU Delft for this. However, as far is I know the above is hypothetical. I have not heard about any plans for working towards a closed loop cycle. 

dinsdag 21 oktober 2014

Feedback collected

On Branco Schippers, Business of business

You mention the concept of a business not being human, but created by humans. I think this is a very interesting concept, posing the question "are we really in control of our businesses?". We would think that ofcourse the director/ceo/founder may be responsible for the business' actions. But also this is not always true, some forces from deeper inside a business that go around the director may be the reason for certain processes. I also agree that a loss of jobs or wages is not desired, allthough this has to be put in perspective. Maybe the company has irresponsibly hired too many persons? Maybe the wages where too high already?


On Branco Schippers, Kuznets explained

Thanks for sharing this interesting view upon the urge to reduce environmental pollutions outputs. I have not yet seen it as a pyramid where certain priorities are dynamic, bound to prosperity. In that sense, when we wished for mobility we could develop a (reasonably) functional system for private car transport. Than why can we not (yet) come up with a system that attacks CO2 as a pollutant? Maybe this takes time.


On Michelle Steenmeijer, the busines of business is to increase profit

I think overall what you say is correct and I can relate to your thoughts. I’m not sure if I understand “efficiency of a product” correctly in the blog. I would think of performance of the product, being able to do more, with less. Personally I am not sure if R&D and robots and such really increas the efficiency of a product. I think a lot of R&D and applying automated techniques is done to increase production rates; more & more, not better products per sé. However I do not know the facts of this. This touches upon another interesting topic; standardising life time of products. Do companies make products that on purpose last less long?


On Michelle Steenmeijer, Materialism and lonliness

I think you picked a very accurate topic (materialism) that relates to our every day lives and the choices we make on a daily basis. It reminds me of a documentary by Alain de Botton, called “Status Anxiety”. Here, he confirms what you are saying: In a civilization where everyone should have the same chances, then why do I drive a Fiat Panda and my neighbour can drive an Audi A8? It is exactly this discrepancy in material goods that we use to read someone’s status: rich or poor.

I find the idea of materials separating people interesting, it is true that some things like the community bbq seem to fade away. Just like kids playing online games instead of playing hide and seek outside. On the other hand, also consider the social connections that can be made thanks to these technological interventions (WhatsApp, Facebook chat, online gaming). I myself am in perfect touch on a day to day basis with my friends from high school who live in different cities thanks to whatsapp, before we didn’t really know what’s going on in eachothers lives. It’s not optimal, but it’s something :)

And just to add a sprinkle of “hope” towards a better consumer market; have you heard of Peerby.nl? It’s a platform for everybody to share everything with everybody! Maybe these things will become more common the next decade.



On Josefine Rook, Friedman Proposition

Hi Josefine,
I agree that consumers can change supply. Actually, I always believe in the idea that whatever products or services there are being sold is a mirror of society. No matter how weird, polluting or green a product is, it is only produced because there is groups of people that want the products. 

So far I can only agree with what you are saying, since what you describe is a personal devolopment that you have made since the beginning of this course.It seems you learned more about your personal opinion along the way which is good!


On Josefine Rook, Rational Decision making

Hi Josefine
I think you clearly described the steps of the RAM, using Obama's decision as an example. I think it is very well applied. 

I do miss the part where you where supposed to "Write an alternative, equally plausible account, showing how these actions might result from a boundedly rational organization (à la Jones 2003)".


On Ilonka Marselis: SES

You present the subsystems clear. Just wondering, how do the the systems together protect us from earthquakes? I personally feel that one part of the system tries to limit the amount of earthquakes, but they do not protect us from them.

I see how you propose to invest in order to have a safe extraction of gas. This itself leads to a sustainable gas extraction, in that sense that the extraction of gas can sustain itself. I must say that I interpret sustainability in this context as a process that does not contribute to the greenhousegasses. Burning fossil gas I think adds to greenhousegasses.


On Tim de Vrijer: SES

I think you touched upon some promising topics that will grow of importance the coming years. What I find interesting is that symbiosis's like recycling and waste stream  collection comes with dependency on other companies/organisations. There has to be a high level of trust in order for these kind of symbiosis to work: if one company shuts down, important streams may shut down as well,  leaving other companies with problems. 


On Paulina Criollo, Nokia


Hi Paulina,

Very good and extensive blog on the Nokia video. I agree with what you are saying. I have double feelings on this way of Nokia by showing their goodwill to improve the situation. It is good that they want to improve their supplying line, however, why did they build/hire this factory in the first place?

I think the coordination system you suggest is a good one, proposing companies to develop stronger norms. I am wondering though, if this can be developed the same way in China as in Western organisations. From what I know of China, the power is very ' top-down'. The government sets the rules and the economy has to follow. Maybe it is up to the government to sharpen the norms? Or better control?


On Rebecca Joubert, Nokia

Hi rebecca,

I think your analysis on the video is accurate. I am wondering if the correct incentives may still motivate the supplier to improve the situation. Maybe in that way Nokia can still keep the same supplier. 

I miss quite a large part from the assignment: 
Is the approach taken by Nokia an effective way of diffusing sustainability criteria?
How could another coordination mechanism improve on this?

I would like to see you view upon this as well.

Kind regards,
Daniël


On Romee de Blois, Resource networks

Dear Romée,

I think you picked an interesting case that is actually regional. I found that quite hard to find actually. The warmterotonde is a good example of a regional case. You analysis is done quite well and the list of stakeholders gives a good overview and also a notion on how large this project actually is.

Concerning the network, I think you are right when saying that it consists of cliques connected through some big/powerfull actors. On your remark:"Because the government is tightly involved the level of transparency is high, creating a lot trust in this stable assembly" I would like to ask you from what perspective it is transparant? For me, complete transparancy is achieved when the organisation or coalition can show a full overview on their activities and spendings. However, I do not see for example how the much the industrial companies are being payed for their heat, or what they have to invest in the pipes in relation to the municipalities? Ofcourse this is the beginning of this project, but I am doubtfull on how transparent this project will be in the end.

I understand that you say that the roundabout is dependent on one resource, heat. Ofcourse withot heat, the purpose of this construction would be absent. However, in this context I think transferring heat is the goal, and by reaching that goal you need many different resources. For one, you need to be able to finance the pipelines. Therefore capital is an important resource. You name investments from outside correctly (like banks). 
Another important 'resource' in this case is the network allignment. In order for a project like this to become a succes, the actors involved need to achieve a high level of trust, since they become dependent from eachother. (if one company quits/goes bankrupt, the network is greatly affected).

About closing the loop, I see that this project definently is an addition to the heating efficiency of companies. However I don't think that this really is closing the loop. In my opinion, closing a loop means reaching a circular system where materials that are discarded after use are used again in the beginnning of the cycle. I think the issue here is that this is not a network of material production, but a network of heat production. And unlike materials, one cannot store heat. In this network, heat is cascaded efficiently over multiple users, after which the heat is lost in the air. 

Also I think it would have been interesting to see how the network that you described reached this cascading energy system. Why could this network specifically reach their goal?


On Hsiu-chuan lin, Resource networks.

No tekst yet.


On Jorine Vernooij, Sabatiers' Framework

Hi Jorinde,Very extensive analysis on the proposed measures. Your structure is clear and this makes the text comfortable to read. I do not have any comments for the rest.Kinds,Daniël
On Vigil Yu, Sabatiers' Framework

No tekst yet.



zondag 12 oktober 2014

Coercing by NOKIA; dark marketing.

This blog post is based on the documentary "A decent business", shown in the SSPM course lecture on thursday 9th of october, 2014. The documentary is available online as well. To be able to understand the this blog post, I advice you to watch the documentary. 

I was quite amazed by the English speaking fellow who guided the ethical assessors of Nokia through the factory and was so open and even laid-back about the situation the factory was in. People being payed under minimum, fining them for being too late and not even having set up contracts with every single employee. He was telling all this, looking as if he doesn't care at all. This observation gave me the idea that this guy would get fired immediately after this documentary aired.

So why would the bloke be so indifferent about the situation? The first thing that comes to my mind, is the helpless situation the factory manager is in. He knows that whatever he says, true or false, it is somewhere on paper and can be checked. So better be honest, at least the guy knew what he was doing, as his body language suggests when exposing the factory's (illegal) activities. He does not take on the role of the victim, I give him that.

Then why is the situation so helpless? Well, NOKIA, probably your biggest client, is on your doormat with a camera crew and they insist that you open up your doors to an ethical assessment. Appearantly NOKIA strives for legitimacy. The documentary aids NOKIA in this in three different ways from my point of view:

1. Obviously NOKIA aims to spread the message "we care" to the rest of the world.
2. Appearently, they are not too scared on showing their inside practices. They even show their naked managers in the very first seconds. Literally a companies being transparent, living up to a word that in my opinion is used a lot but the definition takes many forms.
3. They even criticise themselves. In order for NOKIA to be "fair", start with yourself. This is quite the statement, practically saying nobody's perfect, but we are working on it.

The factory management also strives to be perceived as legitimate. Even the simple things as the big boss saying "all these workers are my friends" with a big smile. A few moments later the guy picks out some workers from the floor for an interview, not even bothering in asking their names. Their numbers suffice. Another way of striving for legitimacy is trying to keep the factories operations within the legal boundaries. "We can't offer our workers legal working conditions? Then we make sure that technically speaking, they all don't work here" (by not giving them contracts ofcourse).

Seems like some harcore marketing by NOKIA, right? Nokia becomes the advocate of sustainability criteria within supply chains (for mobile phones). On the other hand, why did NOKIA choose this factory in the first place? Is it not a bit shady that this ethical check is being done now? Why didn't they check the factory before they started doing business with them? Or why didn't they aid in developing the factory in such a way that all of these circumstances would have been different? This does not become clear from the documentary, so I cannot judge. However, I think the sustainability criteria are "end of the line" criteria. I think there should be clear criteria on what line you set in motion. What factory are you going to do business with and why. These are the sustainability criteria that I would like to see.

Nevertheless, Nokia strives for legitimacy and does this by applying coercive pressure on their supplier by knocking on the door with an assessor. It seems from the documentary that Nokia is the factories only buyer, since they seem to have a lot of power when walking around the factory (demanding information, interviews and meetings).

Other ways of reaching legitimacy for Nokia's supplier are mimicry and normative pressure (DiMaggio & Powell). Mimicry is a way of characteristics transmission among suppliers when a growing number of suppliers in China adopt the operations criteria that comply with Nokia (and probably more companies), resulting in other suppliers to follow this trend, mostly fueled by growing uncertanty. Normative pressure can cause characteristics between organizations or organizational fields to change from within the organisation or field. Education of more sustainable ways of operating production facilities brought along by new employees can start changes for example. A possibility would be that Nokia becomes active in the hiring process of managers of the suppliers factory in order to stimulate normative pressure by hiring persons that bring along the desired norms.



woensdag 8 oktober 2014

A smelly basement (week 41, Social Ecological Systems)

I work in the Science Centre of Delft, a place that people of all ages can visit and get acquainted with TU Delft technologies. When walking through the building, we can see high tech innovations such as superconductivity trains, live flying simulators and 3D printers and scanners. In the back corner of the building something weird is going on. This corner is a bit smelly, like a trash can that has been left open. If you follow the smell, you would climb down the stairs, to the basement, where it is dark and moist. Open a door and you will find something very exciting: a Do It Yourself Bio fermentation installation. Here, biogas is won through the fermentation of bio waste. Ofcourse, this causes the smell.

This Social Ecological System (SES) is quite simple: The installation is being fed with all different kinds of biowaste (Resource units such as lunch leftovers) from all different faculties of the whole campus (Resource system). Unfortunately, there are no constant users at the moment, except for the occasional exhibition by the Science Centre itself (sometimes they extract a bit of biogas to torch a small flame). The Governance System is the TU Delft, of which the Science Centre belongs to. In the end, the TU Delft would posess the power to get the Biogas installation at full speed. They could make sure that Sodexo, the operating catering service at all faculties collects the biowaste and transports it towards the Biogas installation. It is important to know that at this stage, the system is not "running", in the sense that almost no waste is being collected from the campus because the resulting biogas cannot be used or sold yet. 

Now, how can the Friedman principle be put to use in order to sustainably manage this SES? Friedman argues that companies only strive for profit maximization and that social values are not their responsibility. In case fo the Science Centre, which is largely funded by the TU Delft and the Municipality of Delft, striving for profit maximization is not their core business. However, in order to receive the funds, they have to convince their funders that what they do is usefull and within the Science Centre's scope of desired achievements. And in that sense, it will be very difficult for the Science Centre to become a large biogas production station. Funds to the Science Centre are meant to be spent on education of children, students and promotion of the TU Delft, not to be spent on becoming a competitive energy supplier. So, in order for this SES to grow larger, the Science Centre is not a good platform.

Then how can this SES be managed to grow into a large scale system where, say, all TU Delfts waste is used to make biogas? A better platform would be an organization with goals and material flows that allign with the biogas system. A farmer may be an interesting platform, since their material flows consist of bio-products and they have the space to increase the capacity of the system, whereas the Science Centre basement will become to small.

dinsdag 7 oktober 2014

# 4 friedman Proposition

I have to say that my first post on the business of business has little to do with the Friedman proposition, it was more an anecdotic way for me to express myself on the business of business to maximize profit. However I expressed my opinion in a strong way and I have to revoke or re-discuss some of the earlier statements after reading the Friedman article.

First of all, I stated that investing in smaller, local facilities (workshops, art galleries) may socially be more rewarding than for example investing in a fund, where the money is untraceable and thus impssible to assess the social gains as a result from the investment (unless if the companies attached to the fund are 100% transparent). However, possible profit from investing in the fund may be of much larger capital than an investment in small local facility. If this profit is used to support a social goal, the effects may be very powerfull as a result from a larger investment.

Secondly, it is indeed very difficult to define "social responsibilities" of companies. Say a director would spend money that belongs to the company on social ends, what ends should this be? Should this be something related to the company? Or can this be random? How can a director justify this choice? And how would this money be spread equally? So it is too easy to say that companies should respond to their social responsibility, without presenting a system that would actually work, both socially and economicaly.

However, there are examples to be named where companies externalize their costs. The most famous example is ofcourse exploding factories in India, owned by western companies. Or CO2 production in developing countries as a result from industrial activities by western companies. I personally feel that these go in the category "social responsabilities" of companies. And actually, these externalizations are very easy to trace, when these externalizations are defined. Defining them is more difficult though.


woensdag 24 september 2014

Cold North Pole decisions (rational decision and bounded rationality)

1st of may, 2014. The first barrels of North Pole oil arrive in the Rotterdam harbour (volkskrant, 2014). As part of a larger campaign against oil drilling in Nort Pole waters, Greenpeace tried to block the deliverance of the oil by ship. The action resulted in 30 greenpeace crewmembers arrested, including the captain of the Rainbow Warrior ship. 

The North Pole drilling plant is owned by Gazprom, the largest (and only) Russian gas and oil company. The company locates and extracts oil and gas, in order to expand the sales of these two. With the most prominent stocks depleting all over the world, it is important for Gazprom to search for new stocks of gas and oil by all means to keep maximizing sales. This is how they found a stock of oil in the North Pole area, started drilling and became the first exploiter of North Pole fossil fuel stocks. The company aims to improve stock value (Victor, 2008)

This message aims to show how rational decision making (1) and rational organization processes (2) finally lead to actions, using the example concerning Gazprom described above. Using the 2003 article by Jones (bounded rationality and pilitical science), the two processes are motivated. To conlcude, a quick idea will be givin on what factors can be highly influential on Gazproms' rational organization process.

This decision by Gazprom can be seen as a rational decision. This actor has moved to action, which can be explained by three processes (Elster, 2007) that may have played a large role when taking the decision:

- Given the beliefs on the world Gazprom operates in, the action extracting oil from North Pole area's is optimal (expanding sales). 
- Engineers/economists at Gazprom most likely came up with evidence that support the beliefs described above (eg. expected profit)
- The evidence provided must result from an optimal investment in information gathering (eg. possible scenarios on politics, economic processes and consumer behavior)

Another way to look at Gazproms' decision is using the bounded rationality theory that Jones(2003) brings forward. Jones names different aspects of bounded rationality at the organizational level, in other words, an environment of limited information, can constitute a rational decision, but bound to the limits of this environment and the information one is able to obtain within the environment. 

An example of this can be described by the Agenda Setting aspect of bounded rationality. Greenpeace is something that must have been on the agenda of Gazprom, though in spite of Greenpeace's actions, Gazprom continues their drillings in the North Pole. From this we can conclude that Gazprom has put Greenpeace in a less prioritized category. 

Another underlaying process that motivates Gazprom for continuing extracting oil from the Norh Pole is the periphal(parallel) processing aspect of bounded relationality, stating that this type of processing describes how companies deal with multiple streams of input simultaniously, using the method that the company is used to (the known solutions). Serial processing states that a firms' search for new solutions will only occur if past prepared solutions are recognized as invlalid. So far, Gazprom is doing well at reaching its' goal (increasing stock value). Their current activities in the gas and oil industry are succesfull and therefore there is no reason to alter their organizational routines: locating and extracting oil and gas. It has always made profit and greenpeace actions have not caused serious damage or problems to the company before, so why change would Gazprom change behaviour?

Appearently, Greenpeace has little influence to change the agenda setting of Gazprom. So what could be influencial? Victor (2008) describes Gazproms future as challenging, mainly due to uncertenties in oil and gas prices and political pressure. American and European regulations can highly influence Gazproms' sales. It is likely that these subjects will have a much higher priority on the agenda then Greenpeace has. 

References:
Jones, 2003. Bounded rationality and political sciences

Victor, 2008. Gazprom: Gas giant under Strain.

Volkskrant, 2014. Consulted sep 2014.
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/3646403/2014/05/01/Russische-olietanker-houdt-Rotterdam-en-Den-Haag-bezig.dhtml

donderdag 18 september 2014

Numbers, numbers & numbers. (maximization of profit)


I grew up with a little book. I lost it while I was aging but, for last christmas, my mother gave me a new copy of this book: The little Prince.

There is one thing in this book that amazed me so much; it is the part where the author explains how grown ups only see numbers as valid answers. If you introduce someone to your parents, what will they ask? "How old is he?", "What grade is he in?", "How much do his parents make?". They will not ask what his favorite sport is. What his favorite food is. What he did on holiday last summer. How have numbers become so important to the grown ups?

This is what I see happening around me. Numbers are more and more important. How much do you make per hour on your side job? How many comissions did you do? How much profit can you make out of your business? It's about maximisation. Concerning the above, I don't think it is weird at all that Shell is one of the most popular companies to work for in the eyes of the average Delft student. you can do the biggest projects, the farest away over the world, travel the most miles and lay the longest pipeline. A friend of mine was speaking of a project he was working on. "This is really one of the coolest projects I've worked on so far!". "Oh how's that? Please explain". "Well it's an 80 Million dollar project, the most expensive i've worked on!". - Maximization, again.
This maximization, it's nothing but a maximazation of profit. "0,1 % of the 80 million goes to the construction management consultant (which is my friend), can you see how much that is?!".

What happens if this maximization becomes standard? I could see culture and arts die. Why subsidize a local workshop facility? Put the same money in a fund, wait a couple of years and get your profit. Bet this artist could not make the same profit within the same amount of time? Nope. But could the fund inspire as many people as the artist could have? No, because the fund is an abstract. It is nothing. The money is untracable. What did you sponsor exactly with your money?

However, not all maximization of profit is bad. My position in this is: look at the actual reward. This is something different then profit. I built my own music speakers once. It took me 3 weekends. Cost me around 120 euro's in materials. 3 weekends is 3 * 2 * 8 = 48 hours. I earn 10 euro's per hour when at my side-job, so in total these speakers gave me a profit of  -600 euro's. But the reward was outstanding. I have unique speakers, I custumized them according to my own preferences. I learned to work with wood, paint, and laque. I learned to wire and solder the electrical components. I cannot prove if the reward compensates for my "loss of 600 euro's". It does feel that way though. For me that's enough.

So, how rewarding is it to invest in a fund? No idea, because I don't know what I invested in. How rewarding is it to sponsor the local football club? Well, look at the smiling faces of this boys football team with brand new outfits. I wonder how rewarding it will  be, if all coorperations that run on maximation, run on reward? I can't even imagine. 

This puzzles me: Hopping on & off the train.


We all have been there. Slowly the train comes to a halt. You press the button and with a PSHHHHH the door pushes an opening for you to get off the train. As soon as the door opens, a wall of people appears. We now have a very clear example of conflicting interests:

- I want to get off the train -> <- The wall of people wants to get in the train.

I take the first step to the outside of the train, hoping that the wall of people notices that I would like to get out. The wall of people does not move. I try to make eye contact with the wall of people. The wall looks back at me, and starts to move towards me. They seem to be in hurry, which I can imagine. The conductor will blow his whistle in a minute. However, I need to be off the train in time, since staying on the train means that I will see the train doors close from the inside, meaning I will miss my destination. Then the wall breaks. One or two people squeeze out of the wall, quickly jumping in the train. One of them bumps into my shoulder; train doors are not dimensioned for two people entering and one person getting off at the same time. More people squeeze out of the wall and enter the train, and I feel that if I don't throw myself into the wall, hoping that I will break through, I will be stuck in this train for the rest of my life. I lunge myself in the crowd. People react agressively, pushing me to the left and right. I firmly put my feat on the floor and push through. I pop out of the wall, like a zit that is pressed out with brute force.

Now, the puzzle here is: What is the cause for this seemingly inefficient behaviour to happen?

I have three possible explanations for this.

1.
Education. Maybe people are not educated well enough on how we can effectively hop on and off the train. Parents could give wrong examples, where children adopt these. In Singapore, I've seen an attempt in education:
The arrows clearly indicate where to stand. Unfortunately, also in Singapore I have experienced the phenomenon described above. Maybe the the arrows are not big enough?

2.
Stress and comfort. Morning traffic in Holland is hectic. Recently, the president of the Nederlandse Spoorwegen stated in an interview that delays are something that are becoming normal when traveling with the NS; one cannot expect trains to run perfectly on time anymore. One cannot expect to have a seat anymore as well. Therefore, having a seat in the morning is a luxury. This is why people may want to rush in the train; they are stressed and they seek comfort.

3.
Anonimity. Especially in big cities, public transport is used by so many travellers that one can remain anonymous within the mob. The more anonymous, the easier to commit a crime, the less the risk someone will personally prosecute you. This makes bad behaviour easier to commit as well. "I don't care if these people think I am an ***hole, I want my seat in the train". When people recognize you, this becomes more difficult.

Now you may wonder, how is this an industrial ecology puzzle? In line with this course, we could see the use of a train as a social system, just as how we can see a community, city or country as a social system. In the social system train, I see a certain solution to a multi-actor problem (me and the wall of people). We have conflicting interests, and there is little time to try and see how other actors see the same problem, and what their goals and interests are. This seems to be an issue in Industrial Ecology as well. Most Industrial Ecology problems involve many actors with many different goals and interests.

As for the 3 explanations above, maybe these explanations apply in real industrial ecology problems as well? Why does the management of a large factory with a lot of waste heat not use this heat in a symbiosys?

1. Maybe the management has not been educated/informed about the consequences of heat loss, or the efficiency we could reach when heat is used
2. Maybe a large intervention in the factory causes stress for the management, who are constantly pushed to achieve greater profit.
3. Maybe the management does not need to engage in a symbiosis because their factory is not dependant on a good image anyway, it is an anonymous factory.

To conclude, both small and big problems seem to be ruled by actor behaviour. How can this behaviour be changed for the good? And then what is the good?